Moral Fixed Points: Contemporary Approaches to Unnatural Ethics

Abstract

Unnatural moral realism was abandoned by philosophers somewhere in the middle of the twentieth century, when it was left to rust and be forgotten. Despite the fact that the vision has become rusty, it is not lost. To the dismay of many, this kind of moral realism (henceforth, just unnaturalism) has been redeemed, restored, and returned to the mainstream metaethical conversation as a view worthy of careful treatment. The aim of this article is to show the resources that abnormal moral realism has to counter philosophical and epistemological criticisms by strengthening the view in some new areas. We will defend the basic claim that there are many objective moral claims that are also unnatural conceptual truths. These ideas are referred to as moral fixed points. We must claim that they must have a part in any moral law that governs species comparable to ourselves on planets like ours. By adhering to true statements of this kind, naturalists can devise a theory which is both receptive to the more remarkable criticisms which have been made of it and is very attractive in itself. We know that making commitments of this kind in ontology comes at a price. Although we think that obligations from our point of view do not add any new and unwelcome mysteries, we nevertheless need to explain ourselves. We will do it the traditional way, emphasizing all the beneficial work that our existential contributions do.